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Two Artificial Neural Networks Meet in an Online Hub and Change the Future
(of Competition, Market Dynamics and Society)
Ariel Ezrachi* & Maurice E. Stucke**

Introduction

In the future, one may imagine a new breed on antitrust humor. Jokes might start
along the following lines: “Two Artificial Neural Network and one Nash equilibrium
meet in an online (pub) hub. After a few milliseconds, a unique silent friendship is
formed…”
Back to the present; we are not sure how this joke might end. Nor can we estimate
how funny future consumers would find it. We can, however, explain, at present, how
technological advancements have changed, and will continue to change, the dynamics
of competition and subsequently the distribution of wealth in society. How algorithms
may be used in stealth mode to stabilize and dampen market competition while
retaining the façade of competitive environment.
That tale is at the heart of this paper.
We first raised algorithmic tacit collusion in 2015.1 In 2016 we provided further
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context and analysis in our book, Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the
Algorithm-Driven Economy.2 We illustrated how online tacit collusion may emerge
when products are generally homogeneous and sellers do not benefit from brand
recognition or loyalty, and when markets are transparent and concentrated.
In Part I of this paper we expand on the means through which algorithmic tacit
collusion may appear. We examine the conditions for algorithmic tacit collusion and
illustrate, using several recent economic studies, how an industry’s shift to pricing
algorithms can spread tacit collusion beyond duopolies to markets with five or six
large firms. We further consider the joint dynamics of tacit and hub-and-spoke
collusion, and explore the interplay between tacit collusion and price discrimination.
We identify an additional hybrid scenario which facilitates simultaneously both tacit
collusion and behavioral discrimination. In connecting three theories of harm – tacit
collusion, hub-and-spoke, and behavioral discrimination – we highlight how in reality
they can be used in parallel, depending on the market conditions.
Part II explores the challenges in tackling the algorithmic tacit collusion scenarios
with the current enforcement tool kit. We note how some forms of intervention could,
somewhat counter-intuitively, create, at times, new problems that reduce our
welfare.
Part III moves beyond the traditional enforcement toolbox and proposes several
counter-measures to undermine algorithmic tacit collusion, including an algorithmic
tacit collusion incubator. The incubator enables competition officials to test the effects
and likelihood of different counter-measures to destabilize conscious parallelism.
This part also explores the use of counter-measures, which private and government
entities may develop to benefit consumers.

HUP,
2016.
http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674545472&content=reviews.
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See:

Part I

Interlinked strategies – Algorithmic tacit collusion, hub-and-spoke and
behavioural discrimination
I.i The rise of Algorithmic Tacit Collusion
Humans may use technology and algorithms to support traditional forms of collusion
– that is collusion agreed between humans and executed with the assistance of
technology.3 From a legal and policy perspective, this scenario is unremarkable.
Technology in this case does not affect the scope and application of the law.
We focus here on a more complex reality involving algorithmic tacit collusion
(conscious parallelism)4 where the same anticompetitive outcome is achieved (namely
higher prices) without rivals having agreed to tamper with prices.5
Algorithmic tacit collusion will not affect every (or even most) markets. As Virtual
Competition explores, one would expect it in markets with several important
characteristics:

‘Price-fixing: guidance for online sellers’, Competition & Markets Authority (November 2016),
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/565424/60ssprice-fixing-guidance-for-online-sellers.pdf; Jonathan Stempel, ‘U.S. announces first antitrust ecommerce prosecution’, Reuters (April 6 2015), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-antitrust-ecommerce-plea-idUSKBN0MX1GZ20150406.
4 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (describing “the
process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share
monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by
recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and
output decisions and subsequently unilaterally set their prices above the competitive level.; R. S.
Khemani and D. M. Shapiro, ‘Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition
Law’. Paris Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1993, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf.
5 Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright, and Jean Tirole, ‘The Economics of
Tacit Collusion’, Final Report for DG Competition (Toulouse: European Commission, March
2003),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/the_economics_of_tacit_collusion_en.pdf
.
3
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First, algorithmic tacit collusion would likely arise in concentrated markets involving
homogenous products where the algorithms can monitor to a sufficient degree the
pricing and other keys terms of sale.6 Conscious parallelism would be facilitated and
stabilized by the shift of many industries to online pricing, as sellers can more easily
monitor competitors’ pricing, key terms of sale and any deviations from current
equilibrium. In such an environment, algorithmic pricing provides a stable,
predictable tool, which can execute credible and effective retaliation. Software may
be used to report and take independent action when faced with price deviation, be it
from the supra-competitive or recommended retail price.
A second important market condition is that once deviation (e.g., discounting) is
detected, a credible deterrent mechanism exists.7 Unique to an algorithmic
environment is the speed of retaliation.8 Computers can rapidly police deviations, and
calculate the profit implications of myriad moves and counter-moves to punish
deviations.9 The speed of calculated responses effectively deprives discounting rivals
of any significant sales. The speed also means that the tacit collusion can be signalled
in seconds. The greater the improbability that the first-mover will benefit from its
discounting, the greater the likelihood of tacit collusion.10 Thus if each algorithm can

Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control
of concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/ 03), para 41.
7 Ibid, para 41.
8 Contrast this with Ibid, para 53 (“The speed with which deterrent mechanisms can be
implemented is related to the issue of transparency. If firms are only able to observe their
competitors' actions after a substantial delay, then retaliation will be similarly delayed and this
may influence whether it is sufficient to deter deviation.”)
9 Jill Priluck, ‘When Bots Collude’, The New Yorker (April 25 2015), available at
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/when-bots-collude.
10 Samuel B. Hwang and Sungho Kim, ‘Dynamic Pricing Algorithm for E-Commerce’, in Advances
in Systems, Computing Sciences and Software Engineering, Proceedings of SCSS05, Tarek Sobh
and Khaled Elleithy, eds. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 149–155; N. Abe and T. Kamba, ‘A Web
Marketing System with Automatic Pricing’, Computer Networks 33 (2000): 775–788; L. M. Minga,
Y. Q. Fend, and Y. J. Li, ‘Dynamic Pricing: E-Commerce-Oriented Price Setting Algorithm’,
International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics 2 (2003).
6
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swiftly match a rival’s discount and eliminate its incentive to discount in the first
place, the “threat of future retaliation keeps the coordination sustainable.”11
A third condition is that “the reactions of outsiders, such as current and future
competitors not participating in the coordination, as well as customers, should not be
able to jeopardise the results expected from the coordination.”12 Thus algorithmic
tacit collusion will likely arise in concentrated markets where buyers cannot exert
buyer power (or entice sellers to defect), sales transactions tend to be “frequent,
regular, and relatively small,”13 and the market in general is characterized by high
entry barriers.
The stability needed for algorithmic tacit collusion is enhanced by the fact that
computer algorithms are unlikely to exhibit human biases.14 Human biases, of course,
may be reflected in the programming code. But biases will not necessarily affect
decisions on a case-by-case basis: a computer does not fear detection and possible
financial penalties or incarceration; nor does it respond in anger.15 “We’re talking
about a velocity of decision-making that isn’t really human,” said Terrell McSweeny,
a commissioner with the US Federal Trade Commission. “All of the economic models
are based on human incentives and what we think humans rationally will do. It’s
entirely possible that not all of that learning is necessarily applicable in some of these
markets.”16

EC Merger Guidelines (n 6), para 52.
EC Merger Guidelines (n 6), para 41.
13
US
Horizontal
Merger
Guidelines
2006,
available
at
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/801216/download.
14 EC Merger Guidelines (n 6), para 44 (observing that “[c]oordination is more likely to emerge if
competitors can easily arrive at a common perception as to how the coordination should work.
Coordinating firms should have similar views regarding which actions would be considered to be
in accordance with the aligned behaviour and which actions would not.”)
15 Stucke and Ezrachi, ‘How Pricing Bots Could Form Cartels and Make Things More Expensive’,
Harvard Business Review (October 27 2016), available at https://hbr.org/2016/10/how-pricingbots-could-form-cartels-and-make-things-more-expensive.
16 David Lynch, ‘Policing the Digital Cartels’, Financial Times (January 9 2017), available at
http://www.pros.com/about-pros/news/financial-times-policing-digital-cartels/
11
12
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When the above conditions are present, one would expect tacit collusion. Importantly,
the nature of electronic markets, the availability of data, the development of similar
algorithms, and the stability and transparency they foster, will likely push some
markets that were just outside the realm of tacit collusion into interdependence. 17

To be clear, no bright line exists when an industry becomes sufficiently concentrated
for either express or tacit collusion.18 Generally, for illegal cartels involving express
collusion which were detected and prosecuted, the empirical research has that cartels
involving a trade association were on average over twice as large than cartels without
a trade association involved.19 The belief is that express collusion generally
One would expect tacit collusion to be feasible with a larger number of participants than
commonly assumed. On the common market assumptions, see generally R. Selten, ‘A Simple
Model of Imperfect Competition, Where Four Are Few and Six Are Many’, International Journal
of Game Theory 2 (1973): 141; Steffen Hucka, Hans-Theo Normannb, and Jörg Oechssler, ‘Two
Are Few and Four Are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies’, Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization (2004) 53(4) 435–446.
18 Note, for example, research by Levenstein and Suslow, who offer several explanations for the
lack of a clear empirical relationship between industry concentration and cartels involving
express collusion: “First, this ambiguity may reflect the bias introduced by focusing on cartels
that were prosecuted by the U.S. Department of Justice; cartels with large numbers of firms or
that had the active involvement of an industry association may have been more likely to get
caught. Second, industries with a very small number of firms may be able to collude tacitly
without resort to explicit collusion. Third, concentration is endogenous: collusion may have
allowed more firms to survive and remain in the market.” Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y.
Suslow, ‘What Determines Cartel Success?’, Journal of Economic Literature (2006) 44(1) at 4395. EconLit, EBSCOhost (accessed April 6, 2017).
19 One empirical analysis of successfully prosecuted cartels between 1910 and 1972 showed that
cartels on average had many participants: where a trade association facilitated collusion, 33.6
firms was the mean of firms involved, and fourteen firms was the median; in price-fixing cartels
(without a trade association involved), 8.3 firms was the mean and six was the median. Arthur
G. Frass and Douglas F. Greer, ‘Market Structure and Price Collusion: An Empirical Analysis’,
26 J. Indus. Econ. 21, 25, 36-41 (1977). One conservative assumption in that empirical study was
that the number of cartel members prosecuted reflected the total number of firms in the relevant
market. (Ibid at 24). But, aside from ineffectual fringe firms, the relevant market may contain
more participants than reflected in the government's indictment or criminal information, which
does not always identify all the co-conspirators. Consequently, the authors had to exclude from
its sample of 606 cases, those cases where the number of firms allegedly involved were not
specified in the records (Ibid at 25-26). Some co-conspirators conceivably could escape prosecution
(through lack of evidence). Although the authors rely upon an earlier study, which showed a 0.959
correlation between the number of conspirators and total number of firms in the market, the
sample size of that earlier study was 34 cases (Ibid at 28, citing George Hay and Daniel Kelly,
‘An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies’, 17 J.L. & Econ. 13 (1974)). For studies of
17
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represents the outer boundary. (Otherwise why would competitors expressly collude
when they could tacitly collude legally?) One maxim is that tacit collusion is
“frequently observed with two sellers, rarely in markets with three sellers, and
almost never in markets with four or more sellers.”20 Whether this is empirically true
is another matter.21
Even if we accept the premise that tacit collusion is likelier in duopolies than
triopolies and quadropolies, two factors should give us pause:
One factor is that state of competition in major economies, like the United States, is
worrisome, with evidence of increasing concentration and greater profits flowing into
fewer hands.22 Thus, if market concentration increases, more markets may be
susceptible to tacit collusion.

cartels immunized from the antitrust laws, see, e.g., Andrew R. Dick, ‘Identifying Contracts,
Combinations & Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade’, 17 Managerial & Decision Econ. 203, 213
(1996) (discussing that cartels are formed more frequently in unconcentrated industries under
Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act); see also Paul S. Clyde and James D. Reitzes, ‘The
Effectiveness of Collusion Under Antitrust Immunity: The Case of Liner Shipping Conferences,
Bureau of Economics Staff Report’ (Dec. 1995) (finding a positive, but economically small,
relationship between overall market concentration and shipping rates), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/effectiveness-collusion-under-antitrustimmunity-case-liner-shipping-conferences/232349.pdf; see also Maurice E. Stucke, ‘Behavioral
Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century’, 38 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 513, 555-56
(2007) (collecting earlier empirical work on cartels in moderately concentrated and
unconcentrated industries); Ibid at 58 (finding no simple relationship between industry
concentration and likelihood of collusion); Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow,
‘Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration’, 54 J.L. & Econ. 455 at 12 (finding
international cartels prosecuted between 1990–2007 had on average 7.4 members).
20 J Potters,. and S Suetens (2013). ‘Oligopoly experiments in the current millennium’, Journal of
Economic Surveys 27(3), 439–460.
21 Niklas Horstmann, Jan Kraemer, and Daniel Schnurr, ‘Number Effects and Tacit Collusion in
Experimental
Oligopolies’
(October
24
2016).
available
at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2535862 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2535862
(finding
from the extant literature “no robust empirical evidence that would support this claim of a strictly
monotonic relationship between the number of firms and the degree of tacit collusion in a given
market,” but finding this monotonic trend from their own two experiments).
22 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, ‘Market power in the U.S. economy today’ (March 2017);
Economic Innovation Group, ‘Dynamism in Retreat: Consequences for Regions, Markets, and
Workers’ (February 2017); Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin, and Roni Michaely, ‘Are US
Industries Becoming More Concentrated?’ (Feb 23 2017), available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2612047 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2612047.
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A second factor is that the industry-wide use of algorithms, given the speed and
enhanced transparency, could expand the range of industries susceptible to collusion
beyond duopolies to perhaps markets dominated by 5 or 6 players, as we illustrate
below.
Markets in which conscious parallelism was unstable or not present, may see a new
equilibrium emerge, due to increased concentration, transparency, greater stability
and effective punishment. Ultimately we are likely to see more instances in which
similar pricing is not the result of fierce competition, nor the result of cartel activity,
but rather the result of tacit collusion. With the use of algorithms, operators in these
markets will find it possible and rational to weave the tacit collusion model into the
algorithm. While they may use different technologies or algorithms, they will share
an incentive to embed a stabilizing strategy in their algorithms.

I.ii Online Technology and Offline Welfare Effects

To illustrate the dynamic described above, imagine an oligopolistic market for petrol
with limited transparency. The market includes a relatively few sellers and prices
are only visible when reaching each petrol station. In this market, customers may be
subjected to search costs, but could mitigate them by asking their friends about any
available deals, visit a few stations, and support the one with the lowest price. Here
a petrol station, by discounting, may increase its profits and develop a reputation for
having a low (if not the lowest) price. At times, competitors, aware of the price
reductions and promotions, would respond with their own initiative. But the limited
transparency and delayed action are likely to benefit the discounter. Under these
market conditions, conscious parallelism is harder to sustain. The firms will likely
compete as expected. We see here how markets “need to be sufficiently transparent

8
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to allow the coordinating firms to monitor to a sufficient degree whether other firms
are deviating, and thus know when to retaliate.”23
When transparency increases in concentrated markets with homogeneous goods, so
too does the risk of tacit collusion. In what follows we consider three recent economic
studies in three different continents where posting petrol prices online promoted tacit
collusion.
A. Chilean retail-petrol industry
In February 2012, petrol stations had to post their fuel prices on a government
website and to keep prices updated as they changed at the pump. An economic study
found that this Chilean regulation softened, rather than increased, competition.24
The petrol stations’ margins increased by 10% on average following the prices being
posted on the government website. The softening of competition was common across
brands, and was not limited to a single Chilean city. Interestingly, although the
stations’ margins increased across Chile, the effect was not uniform: the petrol station
margins “increased the most in areas with low or non-existent consumer search (lowincome areas), while they increased the least, and even decreased, in areas with high
search intensity (high-income areas).”25
B. Germany
The German government suspected that an oligopoly of 5 firms -- BP (Aral),
ConocoPhilipps (Jet), ExxonMobil (Esso), Shell, and Total – dominated the off-

EC Merger Guidelines (n 6), para 49.
Fernando Luco, ‘Who Benefits from Information Disclosure? The Case of Retail Gasoline’,
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Texas A&M University September 28, 2016, available
at
https://cf00f56d-a-62cb3a1a-ssites.googlegroups.com/site/flucoe/home/Info_disclosure.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7colGaf66bKWn0
h_BnbFaq4kHFB7rYJrb6vZVN6BhIZeTPbNs2LRUOiyuLeAP4jY8YXe3nuDW2dEE2wtLOd0Yi
hxBS-4CB2hgafQqHf5auyPyq_DlPrThncKi7sNvnvXgXomB_Hk3ROwYLV9tZWtlWn5YfDAzjA69ARs8nxOrFEJzac5ULK2lBwGHkIO9QsN9sEdZfUnX1OjUL9J2qE_IWdgPuhA%3D%3D&attredirec
ts=0.
25 Ibid.
23
24
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motorway petrol station business.26 To monitor pricing, the petrol station owners
would drive past specified competitor petrol stations several times a day and note
their prices. The monitored prices were then fed into the respective oil company’s
electronic system. Generally, when one competitor increased petrol price, rivals
generally would respond between three to six hours later.27
To promote competition, the government required the petrol stations to report to its
government’s transparency unit any price changes for gasoline or diesel fuel in “real
time.”28 The government’s transparency unit then transmitted the price data to
consumers, with the aim that they could easily find the cheapest petrol nearby.
Rather than lowering prices, the enhanced market transparency, one economic study
found, increased prices further. Compared to the control group, retail petrol prices
increased by about 1.2 to 3.3 euro cents, and diesel increased by about 2 euro cents.29

Ibid.; ‘Fuel Sector Inquiry’, Final Report by the Bundeskartellamt (May 2011), available at
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Sector%20Inquiries/Fuel%20Secto
r%20Inquiry%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=14. Together, the five
companies had a combined share of approx. 64.6 % of the annual fuel sales, with the remainder
distributed among “a few other large oil companies and a large number of small and medium
sized oil traders.”
27 Ibid. (“If a round of price increases is begun by Aral, Shell reacts in 90 % of the cases exactly
three hours later with a price increase in all of the regional markets, thereby adjusting its price
level to that of Aral. Vice-versa, when Shell starts a round of price increases, in 90% of the cases
Aral follows suit, again after exactly three hours. Total also generally reacts with price rises in
all of the regional markets three or three-and-a-half hours after the start of the price round. Jet
and Esso also react in the same way to rounds of price increases started by Aral or Shell, although
the response patterns differ in some of the regional markets. Nevertheless it can be concluded
that Jet often also raises its prices five hours after the start of a round of price increases, whereby
it generally observes a price difference of one eurocent/litre to Aral and Shell's prices. Esso reacts
between three and six hours after the start of a round of price increases. It is also apparent that
on some regional markets Jet and Esso only react to rounds of price increases started in the
evenings on the morning of the following day.”).
28 Ralf Dewenter, Ulrich Heimeshoff, and Hendrik Lüth, ‘The Impact of the Market Transparency
Unit for Fuels on Gasoline Prices in Germany’ (May 2016), available at
http://www.dice.hhu.de/fileadmin/redaktion/Fakultaeten/Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche_Fakulta
et/DICE/Discussion_Paper/220_Dewenter_Heimeshoff_Lueth.pdf.
29 Ibid.
26
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C. Perth, Australia
Four major oil firms (BP, Caltex, Mobil and Shell) and two supermarket chains (Coles
and Woolworths) dominated Perth’s concentrated retail petrol market.30 In 2001, the
government introduced a petrol price transparency program called Fuelwatch. Each
firm had to submit before 2 pm their next day’s station-level prices. When stations
opened the next day, they by law had to post the submitted prices. Retail prices were
fixed at these posted levels for 24 hours.
Fuelwatch proved useful in promoting tacit collusion. Rivals could see on-line the
prices for every petrol station in the market, and after 2:30 pm each day, tomorrow’s
prices. What the economic study found was that the market leader, BP, through trialand-error and experimentation, eventually facilitated tacit collusion, which
“substantially improved retail margins, created price stability in the presence of
aggregate shocks, and enabled firms to resolve conflict quickly.”31
Now imagine, as is the case in many states,32 a smartphone app tells you the petrol
price at every local station. That may sound procompetitive. The increase in price
transparency lowers your search costs. Indeed, in markets characterized by many
sellers and many knowledgeable consumers, the gas app may promote competition.
But also imagine if the petrol station owners shifted pricing decisions from humans
to pricing algorithms. The combination of pricing algorithms and petrol apps can have
the opposite effect.

David P. Byrne and Nicolas de Roos, ‘Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline’
(January
19,
2017),
available
at
SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2570637
or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2570637. According to the study, “post 2010 we see a change. BP,
the market leader, introduced Thursday price jumps. At first the price jumps were limited to the
majority of its own stations, but soon we saw BP’s competitors conform to the Thursday jumps at
different rates. After only two years, Thursday jumps were solidified as a focal point for setting
market prices.” See David Byrne, ‘How Tacit Collusion Makes Consumers Pay, Pursuit (February
13 2017), available at https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/how-tacit-collusion-makesconsumers-pay.
31 Ibid.
32 Fuel apps have become a common feature and can be downloaded for free.
30

11

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2949434

In Perth, it took, the study’s authors noted, 12 years from the start of the
government’s price transparency policy for the six competitors “to develop a stable
collusive pricing structure.”33 With real-time pricing for each petrol station,
competitors no longer have to drive past neighboring gas stations several times a day,
report the pricing information to headquarters, and then react. Nor do they have to
monitor the government website to identify when another station changes its prices.
Rivals’ pricing algorithms can observe all the competitively significant terms and
promptly respond to any discount. By shifting pricing decisions to computer
algorithms, competitors thereby increase transparency, reduce strategic uncertainty
(when the pricing algorithm cannot grant secretive discounts), and thereby stabilize
the market.34 When one petrol station lowers the price by one cent at 11:33

A.M.,

within milliseconds other nearby stations can respond by lowering their price.
As these case studies reflect, with each firm tapping into its rivals’ real-time pricing,
no petrol station likely profits by discounting. Given the velocity with which the
pricing algorithms can adjust, petrol stations will less likely develop among its
customers a reputation as a price discounter. Accordingly, the competitors will have
even less incentive to discount. We can see that even in markets where tacit collusion
should be unlikely given the number of significant competitors (such as five in
Germany and six in Perth), an app that was meant to promote price competition could
end up undermining it.
On the flip side, the algorithms’ velocity of pricing decisions can shorten the time
period for signaling price increases. Firms would no longer have to rely on lengthy
(e.g., thirty-day) price announcements, where they wait and see what the competitive
response is, to decide whether to raise prices (and to what extent). Computers can
have multiple rounds whereby one firm increases prices and the rival computers
respond immediately and without the risk that the firm that initiates the price
Byrne and de Roos (n 30).
See Salil K. Mehra, ‘Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms’,
Minnesota Law Review 100 (March 10 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2576341, on
how pricing algorithms can promote tacit collusion under a Cournot model.
33
34
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increase will lose many customers to rivals. Essentially, companies may now need
only seconds, rather than days, to signal price increases to foster collusion.

I.iii Hub and Spoke

The industry-wide use of pricing algorithms increases both market transparency and
the risk of tacit collusion. Moreover, in programming its pricing algorithm, each firm
will likely use historic pricing data and competitive responses to calibrate the
dominant strategy. As such, when the algorithms operate within the greater
transparency of their digitalized environment, the computers will already be
programmed to anticipate and respond to rivals’ moves. With the computers’ ability
to police deviations and rely on prior strategies to punish deviations, prices, as a
result of their conscious parallelism, will likely climb not only in duopolies but in
other concentrated markets.
These trends may further intensify when one considers the emergence of hub-andspoke structures.
Our focus here is not on the traditional hub-and-spoke price-fixing conspiracies,
aimed at competitors’ expressly fixing the price or facilitating cartel activities. Rather,
we note how in an online environment a hub-and-spoke framework may emerge when
sellers use the same algorithm or the same data pool to determine price.
In Virtual Competition, we noted the independent business justifications for
competitors to outsource their dynamic pricing to a third-party. The upstream
provider uses its and its clients’ access to industry data to train its algorithms to
optimize price. Rather than incur the costs (and time) to amass the data unilaterally
to train its own algorithm, rivals may find it more cost-effective to use the same thirdparty.

13
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An industry-wide use of a single algorithm, which competitors use to determine the
market price or react to market changes, would result in de-facto hub-and-spoke
structure, as the market behavior of the competitors aligns due to the use of a similar
“brain” to determine their price strategy. These effects intensify when sellers use the
same data pool and are privy to vast volumes of data. Hub-and spoke structures may
therefore be observed at the input level (data) and the output level (algorithm).
To illustrate, let us return to the sale of petrol. Imagine how tacit collusion may be
further stabilized as petrol sellers find it rational to use the same company to provide
them with pricing decisions and allow that company to harvest relevant data to feed
its algorithm.
Take for example a recently reported story about the market for petrol in Rotterdam,
the Netherlands. According to the Wall Street Journal, petrol stations there use
advanced analytics to determine petrol prices, provided by the Danish company a2i
Systems.35 While the use of the same algorithm to determine price may well be
legitimate, one wonders whether it may further facilitate alignment of price
decisions.
The Wall Street Journal story noted how price at the relevant petrol stations dropped
at times, to reflect a change in demand. It also notes how during some periods, ‘the
stations’ price changes paralleled each other, going up or down by more than 2 U.S.
cents per gallon within a few hours of each other. Often, prices dropped early in the
morning and increased toward the end of the day, implying that the A.I. software
may have been identifying common market-demand signals through the local noise.’36
This anecdotal example supports the assertion that as competitors use a single hub
– a single provider for algorithmic pricing – one may expect, in markets susceptible
to tacit collusion, greater alignment of pricing decisions and higher prices overall. In

Sam Schechner. ‘Why Do Gas Station Prices Constantly Change? Blame the Algorithm’, Wall
Street Journal (May 8 2017), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-do-gas-station-pricesconstantly-change-blame-the-algorithm-1494262674.
36 Ibid.
35
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the context of our discussion on tacit collusion, this could evidently further stabilize
the algorithmic driven equilibrium.

I.iv How secret deals can pave the road to near-perfect price discrimination

If transparency fosters tacit collusion, then secret deals should destabilize it. We are
all familiar with secret deals (such as the hotel discount given ‘just to you’) and with
targeted promotions. These may indeed provide a valuable avenue to re-introduce
competition to markets susceptible to algorithmic tacit collusion. When these secret
deals are carried away from the marketplace, they do not trigger a price war. They
can provide a discount on the tacit equilibrium and as such benefit consumers.
Indeed, the competition agency may welcome secret discounts, product differentiation
(as it introduces asymmetry among firms both in terms of cost and quantity) and
reduced transparency. Ideally, a maverick firm would offer secret deals that undercut
the collusive price and thereby destabilize the tacit equilibrium.
Without underestimating these potential benefits, policymakers should be mindful of
two additional anticompetitive outcomes—namely, ‘almost perfect behavioral
discrimination’ and a hybrid discrimination/collusion equilibrium which may follow.
Our concern with behavioral discrimination involves two shifts: first from thirddegree to first-degree price discrimination; and second, shifting the demand curve to
the right in inducing us to buy things we ordinarily wouldn’t have (or want). This is
supported by the use of personal data to track consumers’ behavior, and approximate
the buyer’ price sensitivity, awareness of outside options and willingness to pay.
Increasingly, in our online environment, price is both dynamic and personalized –
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changing based on a range of parameters, such as where we live, the computer we
use, our search history, our loyalty preferences etc.37
Let us return to our petrol station example where tacit collusion was facilitated. To
break out from the equilibrium, a maverick could engage in secrete discounts for the
benefit of consumers. However, in a data-driven economy, this strategy may evolve
and result in consumer manipulation. Using the data it compiles on customers, a
seller can estimate the necessary discount to induce patronage. Advances in customer
profiling and novel personalized pricing strategies may enable the petrol stations to
better approximate a consumer’s willingness to pay – the reservation price – and
charge accordingly.
The ultimate goal for each of the sellers would be to remove the buyer from the
competitive environment (what is often referred to as ‘acquisition’ of the buyer) –
entice loyalty and trust – which would enable subsequent transfers of wealth from
the buyer to the seller.
In our earlier work, we referred to this as the Truman Show – creating a façade of
competition while profiting from the asymmetry of information and degradation of

At the basic level, sellers already ‘personalize’ price with no ‘private’ information - just by
relying on the time and path used before making a purchase. For example, a direct log in to a
seller website will often result in higher price than a referral from a price comparison website.
The logic behind this simple distinction lies in the assumption as to the buyer’s awareness of
outside options. In essence, the net price for a product is adjusted to cater to competition
conditions (dynamic pricing), the awareness of the buyer to those conditions and its reservation
price (personalized discriminatory pricing). If the buyer indicates hesitation – by continuing his
search or leaving goods in the checkout – this can be remedied immediately by offering surprise
discounts and coupons. Framing of the price change as discounts ensures customer satisfaction.
More advanced discrimination may take into account personal information, enabling the seller to
create a more complex profile for the user – taking account of past behavior, preferences,
communications and other data points. These could then be used to determine the order of search
results and the price charged; On the power of algorithm to collect digital crumbs of data and
creates a profile of the users, see: Michal Kosinski: The End of Privacy, available at:
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/michal-kosinski-end-privacy
37
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privacy protection. The buyer – unaware of the customer profile that the seller has
developed about her – assumes that the price is the market price. Given the
profitability of these strategies, dynamic personalized pricing will likely increase
under certain market conditions.38 In such cases, the attempt to increase welfare
through secrete deals may backlash.
I.v Hybrid collusion/discrimination scenario

So far we have assumed markets with stable algorithmic tacit collusion and markets
that shift between tacit collusion and behavioral discrimination. Importantly,
algorithmic tacit collusion and behavioral discrimination can occur simultaneously in
markets where conditions for both exist. Sellers, for example, tacitly collude for the
“low value” and loyal customers and behaviorally discriminate for the “high value”
customers. The seller seeks to lure the “high value” buyers with personalized
discounts. Once the hook is lodged (i.e., the customer’s loyalty is established and
control over outside options is achieved), the seller profits by offering the cheapest
individualized inducement to secure the greatest profits.
To illustrate this strategy, let us go to Las Vegas. One recent experiment involved
about 1.5 million consumers who frequented MGM’s Las Vegas casinos.39 Some
consumers were loyalists: they would have played at the particular MGM casino even
2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines at 6: “[f]or price discrimination to be feasible, two
conditions typically must be met: differential pricing and limited arbitrage.”). Under the first
condition, suppliers “must be able to price differently to targeted customers than to other
customers. This may involve identification of individual customers to which different prices are
offered or offering different prices to different types of customers based on observable
characteristics.”; “In other cases, suppliers may be unable to distinguish among different types of
customers but can offer multiple products that sort customers based on their purchase decisions.”
Under the second condition, “the targeted customers must not be able to defeat the price increase
of concern by arbitrage, e.g., by purchasing indirectly from or through other customers.”
39 Harikesh S. Nair, Sanjog Misra, William J Hornbuckle IV, Ranjan Mishra, and Anand Acharya,
‘Big Data and Marketing Analytics in Gaming: Combining Empirical Models and Field
Experimentation’, Working Papers (Faculty) -- Stanford Graduate School Of Business 1-47.
Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed April 7, 2017).
38
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without a promotion. Others were “low-value” customers: they were either highly
skilled “experts” who win back from the house more than they wager, consumers “who
utilize comps but do not play at the resort,” and consumers “who wager nothing more
than their Free-play dollars, thereby gaining the upside from the promotion, with
little downside for themselves and no gain for the ‘house.’”
MGM casino did not care to compete with the other casinos to attract the low-value
players with promotions. Presumably the rival casinos similarly were disinterested
in attracting the low-value players. Nor did each casino want to condition their
loyalists with the expectation of promotions. They would come to the same casino –
with or without a promotion. The trick was identifying the “high value” consumers,
those with the highest marginal propensity to respond to a promotion, and who would
spend the greatest amount for the smallest inducement needed. The problem was
that the casino’s earlier promotions did not accurately distinguish the “high value”
players from the “loyalists” who needed no inducements and the “low value”
customers, whom it did not want to attract with any promotions. Moreover, as the
study found, there was “an overarching concern that targeting more promotions to
those who have played a lot in the past may be ineffective, because those consumers
may already be on the flat or declining part of their promotion response curve.”
The challenge for the casino’s marketing team was to price optimize (what we refer
to as behaviorally discriminate), namely to offer “a mix of promotions to each
consumer based on what produces maximal marginal benefit at minimal cost.” There
were multiple dimensions to behaviorally discriminate, such as room offers (like the
room type, room discount, number of comp nights, whether the comp is midweek or
weekend); entertainment, sports and facility offers (including the type of amenity and
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discount); casino event information,40 other special event metrics,41 retail and spa
offers,42 air and limo offers,43 free-play and promo-chip offers (like the free-play offer
amount and promo-chip offer amount), resort credits, and food and beverage offers.
Moreover, the challenge was not simply snagging the “high value” customer once.
Rather, it was incorporating the dynamic effects of promotions on each customer “to
get an accurate picture of the ROI profile from the promotions, and to allocate them
appropriately based on their expected long-run benefits to the firm.” Thus, the aim
was to maximize profits from each marginal consumer for whom the promotion would
have an incremental impact.
The means to this end were to mine the casino’s voluminous personal data on the
gamblers to identify whom to target, their potential value, and the best inducement
to maximize the greatest profit. The casino, through its loyalty program, had a lot of
data on many of its customers. So the computer model used data on each consumer’s
observed behavior “at all past visits (and not just the most recent visits) to measure
customer value.” For those consumers on whom very little data existed, the computer
model pooled information from the behavior of similar consumers. The model also
used “information across the entire range of activities by the consumer to measure
how promotions affect behavior.” Moreover, the model metrics were “both historydependent (retrospective) and forward-looking (prospective).” One example is the
customer who visited the casino once, but spent little. If considering solely this past
purchase, the computer might deem the customer “low value.” To avoid this error, the

Ibid (like “inclusion in the casino event prize pool, the prize pool format, indicator for grand
prize inclusion, grand prize format, prize value offered, cost of event for which offer is made, buyin amount, points to entry if offered, tier credits to entry if offered”).
41 Ibid (“like indicators for special event, tier upgrade offers, tier credits offered, offers of points
that count toward higher tiers in the MGM loyalty program, comps linked to points, point
multiplier offers, and multipliers on points that count toward higher tiers (offered on visits that
overlap with birthdays)”).
42 Ibid (like “indicator for a retail offer, retail offer amount, indicator for spa offer, and spa service
amount”).
43 Ibid (like “indicator for an airline offer, air package amount, indicator for limo offer, indicator
for VIP check-in flag”).
40
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computer analyzed not only the historical first-visit information on the consumer but
also “the observed long-run spending of other similar consumers.” Even if the
customer spent little on the first visit, the model, using data from other similar
gamblers, estimated if she, like these other consumers, would likely spend a lot in
future visits. In processing all this data, the computer then identified the focal
consumers to target, how they would likely respond to a myriad combination of
promotions, and the likely profits from each consumer over the long-run under the
different inducements.
The effect of the data-driven personalized promotions, the study found, was between
$1 million to $5 million dollars of incremental profits per campaign compared to the
casino’s status-quo marketing strategy. Profits also increased from the improved
matching of promotion types to consumer types. In sum, a dollar spent in promotions
generated “about 20¢ more incremental profit using the model compared to the [then]
current practice at the firm.”
The casino example illustrates the power of data. That power may be legitimately
used for ‘smart’ promotions. It may also be used to engage in a hybrid tacit
collusion/behavioral discrimination strategy—namely: tacitly collude on the posted
price to profit from the “low-value” and loyal customers; behaviorally discriminate for
the “high-value” customers.
Let us now return to our earlier example of the petrol stations. Suppose petrol
stations have loyalists (those who would patronize that petrol station without any
inducement), low-value customers (e.g., those who buy the cheapest, lowest grade gas,
use the restroom, and rarely buy anything from the store) and high-value customers
(those who are likely to purchase higher margin goods and services inside the gas
station). Because of the ROI from the low-value customers, each petrol station would
have little incentive to deviate from the posted price to attract them. So the baseline
posted price would likely follow our algorithmic tacit collusion scenario. The “low
20
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value” and loyalist customers, like the Germans, Australians and Chileans
customers, pay the inflated posted gas pump price.
On the second level, the petrol stations may mine the personal data to identify and
attract the “high-value” customers. The aim is to steer the profitable “high value”
buyers to its petrol stations through personalized advertising, discounting, bundling
of services, loyalty programs and other inducements. The “high-value” buyer, through
a loyalty program credit card, for example, might get a slight discount at the pump.
As with the casino, the scope of the discount and promotions is determined on that
customer’s predicted lifecycle spending. Once some level of loyalty is established, the
aim, through personalized pricing and discounts, is to maximize profitability over the
lifespan of the customers’ purchase history (the lottery tickets, snacks, food, drink,
and merchandise they buy, and the late fees and interest payments from the gasoline
credit card).
So at the acquisition stage, the petrol station’s discounts, loyalty programs, coupons
and other tools may appear competitive (and contrary to any tacit collusion scenario).
In many ways, at this stage, the brick-and-mortar and virtual competition
environment exhibit similar marketing strategies. The differences emerge in the
second phase, when personalized pricing, based on mining personal data, enables the
seller to customize inducements to attract that particular customer, build her loyalty,
and then maximize profits from that customer (price selectively for that package of
goods to match the customer’s willingness to pay). The buyer is no longer anonymous.
The seller, benefiting from brand recognition, loyalty and asymmetric information,
can determine what is the cheapest inducement needed to reap the greatest supracompetitive profits from him. Optimization may be per deal, basket or over the
customer’s lifetime.
Ultimately our hybrid scenario harms everyone: the loyalists, the low-value
customers and the high-value customers. In combining both tacit collusion and
21

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2949434

behavioral discrimination, sellers profit at each level. The pricing algorithms, in
tacitly colluding over the posted petrol pump price, maximize profits from the lowvalue customers; if the ROI from personalized inducements to rivals’ loyal customers
is low, then the loyalists, like sleepers44, continue to pay the supra-competitive price
as well. The sellers, like the MGM-owned casinos, would employ “a scalable, datadriven micro-targeting policy” to attract the high-value customers, but in the end, the
objective is to secure the maximum profits from them (or, to put it more bluntly, to
fleece them).
Of course, competition can break out in our hybrid scenario. For example, competitors
might differ over who their low- and high-value customers are. One firm’s deadbeat
might be another firm’s prize. But as the algorithms learn through trial-and-error
and with the increasing volume and variety of personal data, they will have a better
idea of the potential ROI for different inducements for each customer. Unless a lowvalue customer’s behavior changes when frequenting a different casino or gas station,
one would expect the algorithms to converge on who is likely to be a deadbeat. If so,
we may see a prime or “base-level” market forming for the loyal sleepers and lowvalue customers, and a different, less transparent market consisting of individualized
marketing efforts to lure the “high-value” customers.
A real-life illustration of a similar strategy may be found in the operation of the
Danish company a2i Systems, mentioned above, whose AI algorithms powers the
Rotterdam petrol stations. The software operated by a2i Systems is focused primarily
on modeling consumer behavior and learns when raising prices drives away

Some customers, for example, are known as “sleepers,” who “out of indolence or ignorance don’t
shop around but instead are loyal to whichever seller they’ve been accustomed to buy from.” Alex
Chisholm (CMA chief executive), ‘Why “Sleepers” Can’t Always Be Left to “Sleep”’, CCRP 2016
Competition Policy Roundtable (London: Competition Markets Authority, 25 January 2016),
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/alex-chisholm-on-consumer-engagementin-a-digital-world [Accessed 3 October 2016]; quoting In Re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation
782 F.3d 867, 874 (7th Cir.) cert. denied sub nom and Aircraft Check Servs Co v Verizon Wireless
136 S. Ct. 524 (2015).
44
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customers and when it doesn’t.45 In a case study found on its website, the company
discussed how it helped OK Benzin, Denmark’s leading petrol station owner, avoid a
price war: “Between 2007 and 2012 the market was characterized by fierce
competition and high volatility. At the peak there were 10 to 20 price changes a day,
and the spread between the highest and the lowest price of the day could be up to 15
eurocent.”46 In enlisting a2i Systems, the leading retail network of approximately 700
petrol stations (which accounted for 25% of the Danish retail fuel market), sought “to
improve the pricing analysis and decision process and optimize pricing according to
their overall strategy in order to lower the cost of price wars or better yet, to avoid
them.”47
In discussing generally about its pricing algorithms, the Chief Executive of a2i
Systems noted that ‘[t]his is not a matter of stealing more money from your customer.
It’s about making margin on people who don’t care, and giving away margin to people
who do care.’48 As the Wall Street Journal reported, the complex algorithm operated
by a2i Systems was tested against a control group which did not use the system to
determine price. The result? ‘The group using the software averaged 5% higher
margins.’49 For the petrol company, a2i Systems notes, “means millions of Euros”
more annually.50

Schechner (n 35). See also the company website: “PriceCast Fuel utilizes Artificial Intelligence
(AI) to optimally reach the local and/or global target for any given station and product. By
continuously monitoring data (such as transactions, competitors' prices, time, location, traffic,
weather, etc.) PriceCast Fuel learns about customers' and competitors' behaviors and optimizes
the price for each product at each site, taking every significant correlation into account.” Available
at http://a2isystems.com/pricecast.html#pricecast-fuel-19.
46
PriceCast
Fuel
Case
Story,
available
at
http://a2isystems.com/files/pdf/PriceCast%20Fuel%20Case%20Story%20('15).pdf.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
45
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I.vi Scaremongers and science fiction
The above discussion illustrates the application of current technologies to online
markets. Importantly, it is neither based on futuristic prediction nor vague
assumptions. It simply describes the current state of technology.
One ought to carefully consider these strategies and their likely welfare effects.
Should one accept these strategies as part of natural market development? Or, should
we introduce checks and balances to more closely scrutinize new market strategies?
Importantly, whichever view one takes on the significance of these present strategies,
all would agree that any enforcement agenda should be carefully measured and
mindful of the risk of over- and under-intervention.
Interestingly, despite these strategies already being present in some markets, some
interested tech companies invest heavily in reframing the debate. They portray the
concerns as futuristic — an interesting speculative discussion. Further, they argue
that the technology is so complex, the industry is so dynamic, and entry barriers are
so low, that antitrust enforcers need not be concerned. In increasing numbers of
events, one hears their lawyers, lobbyists, and sponsored academics encourage
enforcers to keep calm and, preferably, sleep tight. After all, technology is far too
complex for competition officials to comprehend, the risk of false positives are too
great, and markets will quickly correct themselves.
Needless to say, one should indeed remain calm. Indeed, as the next Part explores,
most policymakers, enforcers, and regulators publicly acknowledge the current
changes and are critically assessing how these changes in market dynamics may
require updating or modifying their enforcement tools. They do not necessarily call
for intervention, but the consensus is that the agencies must at least accept the actual
(or potential) change in market dynamics and be ready to critically consider the
adequacy of current enforcement tools to address algorithmic collusion. There is also
24
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a general consensus that tacit collusion, whether algorithmic or otherwise, harms
consumers and that, while merger control may be used to address future risk of tacit
collusion, other enforcement tools cannot directly stop it.
Most policymakers recognize how ‘pricing algorithms may make price fixing attempts
more frequent and potentially more difficult to detect.’51 Most say ‘with confidence
… that the rise of pricing algorithms and AI software will require changes in our
enforcement practices;’ and most would agree that enforcers ‘need to understand how
algorithms and AI software work in particular markets.’52
On the other hand, some competition enforcers believe that algorithmic collusion is
nothing new.53 This divide highlights the two core questions at the heart of our
discussion: First, should the use of algorithms in some instances, in a way that does
not offend current competition laws, lead to an introduction of a new category of
violations? Second, does the competition agency have the tools to confront such new
violations?
The acting FTC Chair recently characterized the discussion of algorithmic collusion
as ‘a bit alarmist.’54

She noted that ‘[u]nilateral efforts to understand market

conditions better and respond to them are a critical part of a well-functioning
economy.’ She added: ‘Nor do I think that the Federal Trade Commission is planning
to take away your ability to use mathematics and computers to fully engage with

Terrell McSweeny, Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, ‘Algorithms and
Coordinated Effects’, University of Oxford Center for Competition Law and Policy (May 22, 2017),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1220673/mcsweeny__oxford_cclp_remarks_-_algorithms_and_coordinated_effects_5-22-17.pdf.
52 Ibid.
53 Leah Nylen and Matthew Newman, ‘Views on Algorithms and Competition Law Expose EUUS divide’, MLex (May 26 2017).
54 Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, ‘Should We Fear
the Things That Go Beep in the Night? Some Initial Thoughts on the Intersection of Antitrust
Law and Algorithmic Pricing’ (May 23 2017).
51
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markets as effectively as you can.’ On the technology involved and the ability to
scrutinize it, she noted that: ‘[t]he inner workings of these tools are poorly understood
by virtually everyone outside the narrow circle of technical experts that directly work
in the field.’55
Reflecting on her comments, we would like to stress the following points. First, we
note that the strategies discussed in this Part are not futuristic; firms are
increasingly using pricing algorithms, some to increase profits and avoid price wars.
Second, while tacit collusion in some brick-and-mortar markets might have
frequently failed or broken down, in other markets the speed and transparency of
algorithms can make tacit collusion more durable. Third, her position is
understandable if the U.S. economy were robustly competitive, and thus even with
algorithms, only a few markets, if that, would be susceptible to tacit collusion—
algorithmic or otherwise. But with the growing evidence of increased concentration,
profits flowing into fewer hands in the U.S., slowdown in startups and worker
mobility, and growing wealth inequality, her statements are curious, especially if the
growing levels of concentration may make more markets susceptible to algorithmic
collusion. Finally, we note how, to date, most strategies discussed are powered by
price algorithms and are yet to include cutting-edge neural networks. The increased
use of neural networks will indeed complicate enforcement efforts. But even then, one
should not accept this black-box argument as a justification for apathy; the agencies
must critically review how these algorithms are affecting affect market dynamics.
We further explore these themes, the question of legality and enforcement, in Part II;

55

Ibid.
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Part II
Enforcement challenges
Having explored the interlinked strategies – algorithmic tacit collusion, hub-andspoke, behavioural discrimination, we now consider the enforcement challenges they
raise.
Several policymakers over the past two years have acknowledged algorithmic
collusion as a possible antitrust concern.56 The European Commission, noted that,
among other things, ‘increased price transparency through price monitoring software
may facilitate or strengthen (both tacit and explicit) collusion between retailers by
making the detection of deviations from the collusive agreement easier and more
immediate. This, in turn, could reduce the incentive of retailers to deviate from the
collusive price by limiting the expected gains from such deviation.’57
The French and German competition authorities similarly noted in a joint report that:

In its 2016 Preliminary Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, the European Commission
noted the rise in use of monitoring algorithms: “About half of the retailers track online prices of
competitors. In addition to easily accessible online searches and price comparison tools, both
retailers and manufacturers report about the use of specific price monitoring software, often
referred to as "spiders", created either by third party software specialists or by the companies
themselves. This software crawls the internet and gathers large amounts of price related
information. 67% of those retailers that track online prices use (also) automatic software
programmes for that purpose. Larger companies have a tendency to track online prices of
competing retailers more than smaller ones… some software allows companies to monitor several
hundred online shops extremely rapidly, if not in real time… Alert functionalities in price
monitoring software allow companies to get alerted as soon as a retailer's price is not in line with
a predefined price.” Brussels, 15.9.2016 SWD(2016) 312, paras 550-551, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiry_preliminary_report_en.pdf
57 ‘Commission Staff Working Document accompanying Commission Final report on the Ecommerce Sector Inquiry’ (May 10 2017) COM(2017) 229 final, para 608. Also note the European
Commission investigations into online sales practices launched on 2 February 2017. As part of
the investigation into Consumer electronics manufacturers, the Commission will also consider
the effects of pricing software that automatically adapts retail prices to those of leading
competitors.
56
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Even though market transparency as a facilitating factor for collusion has been
debated for several decades now, it gains new relevance due to technical
developments such as sophisticated computer algorithms. For example, by
processing all available information and thus monitoring and analysing or
anticipating their competitors’ responses to current and future prices,
competitors may easier be able to find a sustainable supra-competitive price
equilibrium which they can agree on.58
Likewise, the U.K. House of Lords noted how the rapid developments in data
collection and data analytics have created the potential for new welfare reducing and
anti-competitive behaviour, including new forms of collusion.59 And the OECD in
2016 commented that these strategies “may pose serious challenges to competition
authorities in the future, as it may be very difficult, if not impossible, to prove an
intention to coordinate prices, at least using current antitrust tools.”60
We divide the discussion of the key enforcement challenges posed by algorithmic tacit
collusion, under three main headings: Liability, Detection, and AI Law and Policy.
II.i Liability
Algorithmic tacit collusion raises challenging questions with respect to liability. Even
if the agency detects algorithmic tacit collusion, what can they do about it? Under
most jurisdictions’ antitrust laws, the unilateral use of algorithms to monitor and set

Competition Law and Data (May 10 2016) at 14, with reference to our earlier work (‘Artificial
intelligence and collusion: when computers inhibit competition’), available at
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Berichte/Big%20Data%20Papier.p
df?_blob=publicationFile&v=.
59 European Union Committee on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market, 10th Report
of Session 2015-16, paras 178-179, available at
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/129/12908.htm.
60 ‘Big Data: Bringing Competition Policy To The Digital Era’, DAF/COMP (2016) 14 October 27
2016, at para 84, available at https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2016)14/en/pdf.
58
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price is legal, even if it leads to prices above competitive levels.61 After all, one cannot
condemn a firm for behaving rationally and interdependently on the market.62
When the algorithms increase market transparency, defendants will often have an
independent legitimate business rationale for their conduct. Courts and the
enforcement agencies may be reluctant to restrict this free flow of information in the
marketplace. Its dissemination, observed the U.S. Supreme Court, “is normally an
aid to commerce,”63 and “can in certain circumstances increase economic efficiency
and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.”64 Indeed, concerted action
to reduce price transparency may itself be an antitrust violation.65
Accordingly, ‘pure’ forms of tacit collusion which result from a unilateral rational
reaction to market characteristics would not normally trigger antitrust liability. On
the other hand, intervention may be triggered when an illicit concerted practice

Rational unilateral reaction to market dynamics (free from agreements or communications) in
itself, is legal under EU and US competition law, As noted earlier, tacit collusion does not amount
to concerted practice and therefore escapes Article 101 TFEU. Tacit collusion may serve to
establish Collective Dominance under Article 102 TFEU, but absent a separate abuse, it will also
escape scrutiny under this provision.
62 See, for example, Case C-199/92, P Hüls AG v. Commission, [1999] ECR I-4287, [1999] 5 CMLR
1016; Joined Cases C-89, 104, 114, 116, 117, 125, 129/85, Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v.
Commission (Wood Pulp II), [1993] ECR I-1307, [1993] 4 CMLR 407; Cases T-442/08, CISAC v
Commission, [2013] 5 CMLR 15 (General Court).
63 Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 598 (1936).
64 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978); See also Richard A.
Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 160. Generally, the
more information sellers have about their competitors’ prices and output, the more efficiently the
market will operate.
65 See, for example, ‘Federal Trade Commission, Funeral Directors Board Settles with FTC’
(August 16, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/08/vafuneral.htm (a board’s prohibition on
licensed funeral directors advertising discounts deprived consumers of truthful information);
Federal Trade Commission, Arizona Automobile Dealers Association, FTC C-3497 (February 25,
1994) (a trade association illegally agreed with members to restrict nondeceptive comparative
and discount advertising and advertisements concerning the terms and availability of consumer
credit); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Price Transparency,
DAFFE/CLP(2001)22 (September 11, 2001), 183, 185–186 (citing examples of U.S. enforcement
agencies seeking to increase price transparency); compare InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340
F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2003) (lack of price transparency in bond market not illegal if consistent with
unilateral conduct).
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‘contaminated’ or ‘facilitated’ the conscious parallelism. In some instances, the
unilateral nature of the action may be questioned. At times, either a horizontal or
vertical agreement may be inferred. Condemned actions may include signaling,
exchange of information, agreement to engage in common strategy, manipulation
through the sharing of data pools and other collusive strategies.
Illustrative

is

the

EU

Commission’s

recent

investigation

into

suspected

anticompetitive practices in e-commerce. In February 2017, the Commission
announced an investigation into possible breaches of EU competition law by Asus,
Denon & Marantz, Philips and Pioneer. Among other things, the Commission is
appraising whether the companies restricted the “ability of online retailers to set
their own prices for widely used consumer electronics products such as household
appliances, notebooks and hi-fi products.” According to the Commission, “The effect
of these suspected price restrictions may be aggravated due to the use by many online
retailers of pricing software that automatically adapts retail prices to those of leading
competitors. As a result, the alleged behaviour may have had a broader impact on
overall online prices for the respective consumer electronics products.”66
Evidently, antitrust intervention is easier when algorithms are part of a wider
collusive agreement to tamper with market prices.67 Similarly, weaker forms of
signaling, aimed at coordinating practice of the market could be condemned.
But, the challenging question remains: should ‘pure’ forms of conscious parallelism
be condemned? Ought we condemn the facilitation of tacit collusion through artificial
means? Should one condemn a firm for behaving rationally and developing,

‘Antitrust: Commission opens three investigations into suspected anticompetitive practices in
e-commerce’, European Commission (2 February 2017), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-17-201_en.htm.
67 See for example: Topkins, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-e-commerceexecutive-charged-price-fixing-antitrust-divisions-first-online-marketplace.
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unilaterally, an algorithm that accounts publically available information while
operating interdependently on the market?68
One way to square this circle may be framing the issue as market manipulation or
an unfair practice. The focus shifts from the presence of an agreement among
companies to the use of advanced algorithms to transform pre-existing market
conditions in such a way to facilitate tacit collusion. While the mutual price
monitoring at the heart of tacit collusion is legal under competition law, one may ask
whether the creation of such a market dynamic, through “artificial” means, gives rise
to antitrust intervention.
Using such an approach, one could consider application of legislation such as Section
5 of the FTC Act, which targets unfair facilitating practices.69 Noteworthy is how the
US courts set a rather high level of intervention. Under the legal standard applied in
Ethyl70, the FTC must show either (1) evidence that defendants tacitly or expressly
agreed to use pricing algorithms to avoid competition, or (2) oppressiveness, such as
(a) evidence of defendants’ anticompetitive intent or purpose or (b) the absence of an
independent legitimate business reason for the defendants’ conduct. 71 Accordingly,
defendants may be liable if, when developing the algorithms or in seeing the effects,
they were (1) motivated to achieve an anticompetitive outcome, or (2) aware of their
actions’ natural and probable anticompetitive consequences.
An alternative route may target “abuse” of excessive transparency, possibly
where clear anticompetitive intent is present. One could employ the rationale

See, for example, Case C-199/92, P Hüls AG v. Commission, [1999] ECR I-4287, [1999] 5 CMLR
1016; Joined Cases C-89, 104, 114, 116, 117, 125, 129/85, Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v.
Commission (Wood Pulp II), [1993] ECR I-1307, [1993] 4 CMLR 407; Cases T-442/08, CISAC v
Commission, [2013] 5 CMLR 15 (General Court).
69 The FTC was unsuccessful in its attempt to prove such facilitating practices in Boise Cascade
Corp. v. F.T.C., 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980) and E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. F.T.C., 729
F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
70 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. F.T.C., 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
71 Ibid, 128, 139.
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used in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) case against Athena
Capital Research.72 In 2014, the SEC for the first time sanctioned the high-frequency
trading firm for using complex computer programs to manipulate stock prices.73 The
sophisticated algorithm, code-named Gravy, engaged in a practice known as “marking
the close” in which stocks were bought or sold near the close of trading to affect the
closing price: “[t]he massive volumes of Athena’s last-second trades allowed Athena
to overwhelm the market’s available liquidity and artificially push the market price—
and therefore the closing price—in Athena’s favor.”74 Athena’s employees, the SEC
alleged, were “acutely aware of the price impact of its algorithmic trading, calling it
‘owning the game’ in internal e-mails.”75 Athena employees “knew and expected that
Gravy impacted the price of shares it traded, and at times Athena monitored the
extent to which it did. For example, in August 2008, Athena employees compiled a
spreadsheet containing information on the price movements caused by an early

Ibid. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-16199
(October 16, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/34-73369.pdf.
73 The computer trading program was “placing a large number of aggressive, rapid-fire trades in
the final two seconds of almost every trading day during a six-month period to manipulate the
closing prices of thousands of NASDAQ-listed stocks.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
SEC Charges New York–Based High Frequency Trading Firm with Fraudulent Trading to
Manipulate
Closing
Prices,
October
16,
2014,
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543184457#.VEOZlfldV8E.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid. As the SEC alleged Athena’s manipulative scheme focused on trading in order to create
imbalances in securities at the close of the trading day: “Imbalances occur when there are more
orders to buy shares than to sell shares (or vice versa) at the close for any given stock. Every day
at the close of trading, NASDAQ runs a closing auction to fill all on-close orders at the best price,
one that is not too distant from the price of the stock just before the close. Athena placed orders
to fill imbalances in securities at the close of trading, and then traded or ‘accumulated’ shares on
the continuous market on the opposite side of its order.” According to the SEC’s order, Athena’s
algorithmic strategies became increasingly focused on ensuring that the firm was the dominant
firm—and sometimes the only one—trading desirable stock imbalances at the end of each trading
day. The firm implemented additional algorithms known as “Collars” to ensure that Athena’s
orders received priority over other orders when trading imbalances. These eventually resulted in
Athena’s imbalance-on-close orders being at least partially filled more than 98 percent of the time.
Athena’s ability to predict that its orders would get filled on almost every imbalance order allowed
the firm to unleash its manipulative Gravy algorithm to trade tens of thousands of shares right
before the close of trading. As a result, these shares traded at artificial prices that NASDAQ then
used to set the closing prices for on-close orders as part of its closing auction. Athena’s highfrequency trading scheme enabled its orders to be executed at more favorable prices.
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version of Gravy.”76 Athena configured its algorithm Gravy “so that it would have a
price impact.”77 In calling its market-manipulation algorithm Gravy, and by
exchanging a string of incriminating e-mails, the company did not help its case.
Without admitting guilt, Athena paid a $1 million penalty. This demonstrates that
automated trading has the potential to increase market transparency and efficiency,
but it can also lead to market manipulation.78 Finding the predominant purpose for
using an algorithm will not always be straightforward. Athena, for example,
challenged the SEC’s allegations that it engaged in fraudulent activity: “While
Athena does not deny the Commission’s charges, Athena believes that its trading
activity helped satisfy market demand for liquidity during a period of unprecedented
demand for such liquidity.”79 A court might agree. Companies, learning from Athena,
can be more circumspect in their e-mails.80
Another possible intervention path, of a more general nature, may involve the use of
market or sector investigations. Such approach may prove useful in helping
agencies understand the new dynamics in algorithm-driven markets and the
magnitude of any competitive problems. In some jurisdictions, like the United
Kingdom, market investigation laws also provide for a wide scope of behavioral and
structural remedies.81 Following an investigation the agency may benefit from a
flexible tool box that is unavailable through other means.

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-16199, para.
34.
77 Ibid, para. 36.
78 Peter J. Henning, ‘Why High-Frequency Trading Is so Hard to Regulate’, New York Times
(October 20, 2014), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/why-high-frequencytrading-is-so-hard-to-regulate/.
79 Steve Goldstein, ‘High-Frequency Trading Firm Fined for Wave of Last-Minute Trades’, Market
Watch (October 16 2014), available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/high-frequencytrading-firm-fined-for-wave-of-last-minute-trades-2014-10-16.
80 Moreover, evidence of intent will likely be mixed when each firm has valid independent business
reasons to develop and implement a pricing algorithm. After all, the first firm to use the pricing
algorithm could not be accused of colluding, as the market was likelier less transparent, and rivals
could not match the speed of the first mover’s price changes.
81 The U.K. Competition and Markets Authority, for example, can initiate market investigations,
gather and appraise evidence, and, where necessary, impose structural or behavioral remedies;
Competition Commission, Guidelines for Market Investigations: Their Role, Procedures,
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II.ii Detection
Assuming that the illegality of algorithmic tacit collusion is given, one subsequently
faces the challenge of detection.
Before you prosecute a crook, you must first detect the crime. That is easy with bank
robbery, but not with tacit collusion. One interesting consequence of algorithm-driven
tacit collusion is the difficulty in identifying the counterfactuals — in other words,
the competitive position absent the industry-wide use of pricing algorithms.
In practice, it may be difficult for an enforcer or regulator to conclude whether a
market dynamic forms a ‘natural’ outcome or was ‘artificially’ enhanced or created.
In a market dominated by algorithms, absent a natural experiment or counterfactual
(such as a similar market without algorithms), enforcers may not readily discern
whether the market price is the result of artificial intervention or natural dynamics:
the dynamic price may be the only market price.
One answer may involve auditing the algorithm. Under an auditing regime, the
agency will assess whether an algorithm was designed to foster a change in the
market dynamics. This approach resembles pre-merger review – where the agency
predicts whether the proposed merger may substantially lessen competition.
Accordingly, algorithms could be activated in a ‘sand box’ where their effects will be
observed and assessed.
Auditing at times can predict anticompetitive outcomes, but it has its share of
problems. Based on our discussions with computer scientists, it is not as simple as
Assessment
and
Remedies,
CC3
(Revised)
(April
2013),
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284390/cc3_revise
d.pdf (adopted by the CMA Board).
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opening the hood of the car to see what’s causing the irregularity. To begin with, it
may be hard to establish whether the algorithm submitted for audit is the one used
in the marketplace. This isn’t simply a bait-and-switch by the firms. Rather, through
machine-learning, trial-and-error, and market changes, the algorithm itself evolves.
Similarly, the ease with which audited algorithm may be amended and set different
optimization goals could undermine effective scrutiny. Other challenges include the
sheer number of algorithms which would require scrutiny, the high level of expertise
required to assess their effects, the ability to identify credible counterfactuals, and
barriers associated with commercial secrecy. Lastly, in the case of neural networks,
it may be impossible to effectively audit a complex system and determine its likely
effects.
Some challenges may be addressed by shifting the burden to the companies and
imposing on them a duty to comply with a set of guidelines and principles of
compliance by design. One could imagine the creation of an industry code of practice,
which companies must follow when designing the algorithms. Random inspections
perhaps could increase deterrence and compliance.
Yet, even if one shifts the burden to companies and assumes clear benchmarks for
intervention - technology may undermine the effectiveness of intervention. Already
we witness the use of advanced, more complex algorithms which, as a result are more
difficult to audit. This trend will likely intensify as more data can be analyzed, and
changing market dynamics can be addressed, through the use of Artificial
Intelligence (AI).
Of relevance are recent developments in Artificial Neural Networks, also known as
‘Deep Learning’, which aim to mimic the brain’s cognitive and computation
mechanisms. These complex networks consist of a large number of computation units
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(neurons), interconnected across several layers.82 They have already contributed to
significant advances in solving some of the harder, longstanding challenges for the
AI community thus far. By 2017, they have matched or surpassed human
performance in a variety of tasks, such as identifying malignant tumors in breast
cancer images, image labeling, speech recognition and language translation.83 Their
rapid self-improvement has already resulted in instances in which they evolved
beyond recognized human-like decision-making.84
An AI program, that its developers at Carnegie-Mellon University called “Libratus,”
recently defeated several top poker players. This achievement becomes even more
impressive when considering the following: First none of Libratus’s algorithms were
specific to poker. As one of developers told the press, “We did not program it to play
poker. We programmed it to learn any imperfect-information game, and fed it the
rules of No-Limit Texas Hold’em as a way to evaluate its performance.” 85 The AI
program learned the optimal strategy. Second, Libratus playing style was unlike a
human’s. The human players could not always identify the computer’s dominant
strategy. What seemed like bad moves by the computer actually turned out to be good
Ittoo, Nguyen and van den Bosch. ‘Text analytics in industry: Challenges, desiderata and
trends’,
Computers
in
Industry,
vol.
78,
2016,
available
at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166361515300646
or
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compind.2015.12.001.
83 Yun Liu et al., ‘Detecting Cancer Metastases on Gigapixel Pathology Images’, available at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1T58bZ5vYa-QlR0QlJTa2dPWVk/view (in identifying for breast
cancer patients whether the cancer has metastasized away from the breast, a trained algorithm
could review large expanses of biological tissues, and automatically detect and localize tumors as
small as 100 ×100 pixels in gigapixel microscopy images sized 100, 000×100, 000 pixels, with a
rate of 8 false positives per image, and detecting 92.4% of the tumors, relative to 82.7% by the
previous best automated approach, and a 73.2% sensitivity for human pathologists); Le Cun,
Bengio and Hinton, ‘Deep Learning - Review’, Nature, vol. 521, 2015, available at
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v521/n7553/pdf/nature14539.pdf
or
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature14539.
84 Note for example the way in which computerized investment decision has outperformed
humans. See: Gregory Zuckerman and Bradley Hope, ‘The Quants Run Wall Street Now’ Wall
Street Journal (26 May 2017), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-quants-run-wallstreet-now-1495389108.
85 Charlie Wood, ‘Bot makes poker pros fold: What's next for artificial intelligence?’, The Christian
Science Monitor (February 4 2017), available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/Technology/2017/0204/Bot-makes-poker-pros-fold-What-s-next-forartificial-intelligence.
82
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moves.86 And the computer’s strategies seemingly varied hand-by-hand. Third, the
computer’s strategies evolved day-by-day. When the humans found weaknesses in the
computer’s play, the players could not quickly exploit these weaknesses. The
computer already prioritized identifying and correcting these holes.87 After twenty
days of playing poker, Libratus won decisively.
Another example involves Google’s AlphaGo algorithm, which defeated in 2017 the
world’s best Go player. Humans have played Go, which is noted for its myriad possible
moves, for centuries. Noteworthy wasn’t that the best player was defeated. Rather,
Go players have praised the algorithm’s ability “to make unorthodox moves and
challenge assumptions core to a game.”88 The world’s best player, after being
defeated, noted that “Last year, it was still quite humanlike when it played, but this
year, it became like a god of Go.”89
Let us now consider the possible application of the technology to online markets.
Deep Learning techniques are now powering many of the applications that we use on
a daily basis. These include voice recognition systems (on our mobile phones), and
facial recognition systems (used by Facebook). Deep Learning has also shown much
promise in directing self-driving cars.
The technology is often used in conjunction with another paradigm, known as
Reinforcement Learning, which prescribes how agents should act in an environment
in order to maximize future cumulative reward. The combination of Deep Learning
and Reinforcement Learning is promising. It heralds the emergence of algorithms
“ingrained” with advanced human cognitive abilities, such as playing Atari

‘How AI beat the best poker players in the world’ Engadget R+D (February 10 2017), available
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jLXPGwJNLHk.
87 Ibid.
88 Paul Mozur, ‘Google’s AlphaGo Defeats Chinese Go Master in Win for A.I.’, The New York
Times (May 23 2017).
89 Ibid.
86
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videogames and more importantly, beating the human champion at the GO game,
considered as one of the AI holy grails.90
Due to their complex nature and evolving abilities when trained with additional data,
auditing these networks may prove futile. The knowledge acquired by a Deep
Learning network is diffused across its large number of neurons and their
interconnections, analogous to how memory is encoded in the human brain. These
networks, based on non-linear transformations, are considered as opaque, black
boxes.91 Enforcers may lack the ability to trace back the steps taken by algorithms
and unravel the self-learning processes. If deciphering the decision making of a deep
learning network proves difficult, then identifying an anticompetitive purpose may
be impossible.
II.iii AI Law and Policy
Antitrust law is not fixed. With new harms come new laws to prevent that harm. This
brings us to the issue with which policymakers are now grappling – not only for
algorithmic collusion but driverless cars and other AI technology: to what extent
should humans be liable for the actions of the algorithm?
In a simple scenario using today’s technology, one could envisage the human operator
embedding the tacit collusion model into the algorithm. Although there is no
anticompetitive “agreement” among rivals, the human involvement, if one opt to
condemn that action, may be relatively easy to detect. But, as noted above, the future
heralds more advanced technologies that will be able to act independently, with no

Dharshan Kumaran and Demis Hassabis, ‘From Pixels to Actions: Human-level control through
Deep Reinforcement Learning’, Google Research Blog (February 25 2015), available at
https://research.googleblog.com/2015/02/from-pixels-to-actions-human-level.html.
91 Castelvecchi, ‘Can we open the black box of AI?’, Nature, vol. 538, 2016, available at
http://www.nature.com/news/can-we-open-the-black-box-of-ai-1.20731
or
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/538020a; for the broader implications, see Frank Pasquale, ‘The Black
Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information’ (Harvard University
Press 2015).
90
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human input. The algorithm isn’t programmed to tacitly collude. Programmed with
basic game theory, the algorithm like the one that defeated the world’s best poker
players, will identify the dominant strategy on its own to maximize profits.
A recent experiment — conducted in Google’s advanced Deep Mind neural network
— set to identify the dominant strategy that Deep Mind will deploy.92 Interestingly,
in an environment with limited resources, Deep Mind deployed aggressive strategies
in an effort to win the competition. However, when collaboration was deemed more
profitable (Wolfpace game) two neural agents learned from experimenting in the
environment and collaborated to improve their joint position. It will be interesting,
as the literature and technology evolve, to see whether the Wolfpace scenario
foreshadows the algorithmic tacit collusion scenarios where computers on their own
migrate to conscious parallelism as their dominant strategy.
If so, can companies be blamed if their smart algorithms subsequently and
independently identify the benefits of interdependence under the tacit collusion
scenarios? Suppose, unlike the developers of Gravy, the company did not program its
algorithm to manipulate the market. Nonetheless as the market dynamics evolve, the
algorithms learn that the dominant rational strategy is tacit collusion. To what extent
can the company be liable for the action of self-learning machine? And what checks
and balances could one impose to prevent machines from changing market dynamics?
The European Commission, among others, is currently grappling with these issues.
It noted how more autonomous decision-making may “conflict with the current
regulatory framework which was designed in the context of a more predictable, more
manageable and controllable technology.”93 It recommended clarifying and, if

Joel Z. Leibo et al, ‘Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas’
https://storage.googleapis.com/deepmind-media/papers/multi-agent-rl-in-ssd.pdf; Also see short
interview
with
Joel
Z
Leibo,
the
lead
author
on
the
paper
at
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/artificial-intelligence-social-impact-deepmind.
93 European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document on the free flow of data and
emerging issues of the European data economy Brussels’, 10.1.2017 SWD(2017) 2 final, at 43.
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necessary, adapting the legislative framework.94 Among the legal approaches under
consideration are:
•

a strict liability regime;

•

a liability regime based on a risk-generating approach (whereby “liability
would be assigned to the actors generating a major risk for others and
benefitting from the relevant device, product or service”), and

•

a risk-management approach (whereby “liability is assigned to the market
actor which is best placed to minimize or avoid the realisation of the risk or to
amortize the costs in relation to those risks”).95

One significant obstacle with a risk-based approach for algorithmic tacit collusion is
our ability to understand the magnitude and likelihood of risk and the actuality of
harm. When a self-driving car hits a human, the harm is clear. But as discussed above
for decades, antitrust enforcers (even with an attractive leniency policy) have had a
hard time detecting express collusion. Detecting tacit collusion is often more difficult
(especially when interdependence can appear in competitive markets). Like the
human players against Libratus or AlphaGo, divining the strategy of a pricing
algorithm may prove even more difficult.
As EU Commissioner Vestager noted, “[t]he trouble is, it’s not easy to know exactly
how those algorithms work. How they’ve decided what to show us, and what to hide.
And yet the decisions they make affect us all.”96 Significant is the ability of Deep
Learning to adjust to changing environment and engage in cognitively intensive
tasks. As such they form a superior tool to determine market strategy in a changing

Ibid.
Ibid. at 45. As a complement to the above, the Commission also is entertaining voluntary or
mandatory insurance schemes for compensating the parties who suffered the damage.
96 ‘Algorithms and competition’, Bundeskartellamt 18th Conference on Competition, Berlin (16
March
2017),
available
at
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/20142019/vestager/announcements/bundeskartellamt-18th-conference-competition-berlin-16-march2017_en.
94
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environment.97 Indeed, some studies have already highlighted the potential of
simpler, basic ANN for dynamic pricing.98 Another noteworthy characteristic is their
ability to learn from experience.99 This alleviates the need for prior “hand-crafted”
knowledge fed in by human in order to learn a perceptual representation of the world.
The self-learning nature enables them to untangle underlying factors in data and to
adjust their learning process so that they progressively improve their performance
until achieving the desired outcome.100 For instance, AlphaGo, Google’s Deep
Learning-based GO champion, and Libratus learned to discover new strategies.
Vestager commented on this challenge and opined that ‘Competition enforcers need
to be suspicious of everyone who uses an automated system for pricing’ and that
‘businesses . . . need to know that when they decide to use an automated system, they
will be held responsible for what it does, so they had better know how that system
works.’101 On a positive note, Vestager’s comments make clear that autonomous
machines can play a greater role in our markets and lives and some accountability
(or compensatory) measure must exist to promote an inclusive economy. The
challenge is in adapting the legislative framework so that citizens can trust and
benefit from this technology while enabling the industry to “lead and capture the
opportunities arising in this field.”102

Leslie Smith, ‘An Introduction to Neural Networks’, University of Stirling Centre for Cognitive
and
Computational
Neuroscience
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October
1996),
available
at
http://www.cs.stir.ac.uk/~lss/NNIntro/InvSlides.html.
98 Ghose and Tran, ‘A dynamic pricing approach in e-commerce based on multiple purchase
attributes’, in Proceedings of the 23rd Canadian conference on Advances in Artificial Intelligence,
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6085,
2010,
available
at
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-13059-5_13.
99,Smith (n 98).
100 Castelvecchi, ‘Can we open the black box of AI?’, Nature, vol. 538, 2016, available at
http://www.nature.com/news/can-we-open-the-black-box-of-ai-1.20731
or
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/538020a.
101 Lewis Crofts and Matthew Newman, ‘Vestager warns of pricing algorithms' antitrust impact’,
MLex (16 March 2017) reporting on the Commissioner’s speech at the Bundeskartellamt IKK
Conference.
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Part III
Counter-measures

Rather than legally challenge algorithmic tacit collusion, policymakers or consumer
organizations may attempt to actively destabilize it. Such approach would seek to
change the market dynamics so to undermine possible conscious parallelism, while
avoiding the possible pitfalls presented by almost perfect price discrimination.
Change of market dynamics may be achieved by using the same technology to power
counter-measures or through carful intervention by the state.
III.i Algorithmic Collusion Incubator
To explore the validity and effectiveness of several of the counter-measures, the
competition agencies can begin commissioning (or internally conducting) experiments
with pricing algorithms. One way is if an agency examined the available pricing
algorithms in the market, and then using the data and algorithms, ran simulations
in a collusion incubator.103 The agency algorithms could shadow the industry’s
algorithms, until it was mirroring the industry responses. The agency would then test
what conditions added to (or removed from) the incubator would make tacit collusion
likelier and more durable. What factors destabilize tacit collusion? How do the pricing
algorithms respond when a company with a similar algorithm (but different discount
factor) enters the market? When do firms become mavericks (or become co-opted)?
What happens when price changes decelerate? Here, the agency can see how the
algorithms respond, and what factors help promote, stabilize and destabilize
algorithmic tacit collusion.

Jin Li and Charles Plott, ‘Tacit Collusion in Auctions and Conditions for Its Facilitation and
Prevention: Equilibrium Selection in Laboratory Experimental Markets’, available at
https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/li/htm/Published%20Papers/Li_Plott%20Tacit%20
Collusion%20071121.pdf.
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Granted, such an incubator is imperfect. The incubator is relatively static and will
not reflect changes in market dynamics over the long term and changes to the
algorithms – a result of self-learning or human intervention. Nonetheless, these
algorithmic collusion incubators can help the agencies better understand what factors
are worth exploring to destabilize tacit collusion.
Let us explore some of the available options to test in the incubator.
III.ii Deceleration
If the speed and frequency of algorithms’ price adjustments facilitate collusion, then
one disruptive approach may include reducing the speed and frequency with
which sellers can adjust prices.
This counter-measure is implemented in the fuel sector in Austria and Western
Australia, where sellers are limited in their ability to match each other’s price more
than once a day. In reducing the number of price changes, the mechanism seeks to
allow competitors to undercut the collusive price and promote a seller’s reputation as
a discounter. The pricing algorithms, while continually monitoring the rivals’ pricing
and business maneuvers, would now face a time delay in changing price. Under this
scenario, the maverick—if the delay were long enough—could profit from being the
first to discount.
Not surprisingly, state intervention in the market, through disruptive algorithms or
other means, can lead to sub-optimal results. For instance, restrictions on the speed
of price changes may result in the state preventing sellers from discounting.
An alternative would be if the government allowed price decreases to be
implemented immediately, but imposed a time lag for price increases.
It would be interesting to test whether pricing algorithms, like humans, could game
the system. For example, a dominant incumbent could punish the maverick by
undercutting its price. The maverick could not immediately raise its price, and might
be forced to discount even further. Taking this into account, the maverick’s algorithm,
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before discounting, would likely calculate the probability of incumbents retaliating,
its costs (including lost profits) in discounting, and the benefits (which would be slight
if rivals could instantly match the maverick’s lower price). The governmental pricing
delay—rather than helping the maverick and consumers—would instead serve as a
punishment mechanism for defecting from the supra-competitive price. In reducing
the maverick’s incentives to discount where retaliation is likely, the governmental
pricing delay instead could foster unintentionally tacit collusion.

III.iii Reducing Transparency to the buyers’ advantage
The government can target public policies that help facilitate collusion without
necessarily improving the buyers’ welfare. As former FTC Chair Bill Kovacic
observed:
A major example is the process for opening bids in a sealed bid procurement. Bids
ordinarily are unsealed in a public setting and are displayed for all offerors to
observe. This procedure enables cartel participants to determine whether their coconspirators abided by the terms of their agreement to rotate bids or otherwise
suppress rivalry. An obvious reform would be to permit inspection of bids by a
guardian internal to the purchasing organization, such as an inspector general.
This simple measure would complicate the detection of cheating by cartel
members and still ensure that the winning offeror has been identified correctly.104
Another easy case is cheap talk, where sellers benefit from the information exchange,
while customers do not.105
Beyond the easy cases, one obvious challenge is fine-tuning the enforcement policy to
interdict the factors responsible for the collusive equilibrium without undermining
the competitive process itself. Such intervention may also lead to an arms race
between sellers and buyers. The former may likely benefit from resources and

William E. Kovacic, ‘Antitrust Policy and Horizontal Collusion in the 21st Century’, 9 Loy.
Consumer L. Rep. 97, 107 (1997).
105 See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, ‘Evaluating the Risks of Increased Price Transparency’, 19
Antitrust 81 (Spring 2005).
104
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technological advantage. With the ability to rely on advanced algorithms to change
the market dynamics and the possibility to use artificial intelligence to perfect the
strategy, could competition law enforcers effectively identify and target such
strategies?
But transparency is not a light switch where consumers and sellers are either in the
dark or sunlight. As the economic literature shows, “what matters is not what is
directly observed by the firms, but what information firms can infer from available
market data. When the market is stable, inferring deviations from collusive conduct
is easier and requires less market data than when the market is unstable.”106 Here,
testing in the algorithmic collusion incubator might enable the government to identify
and fine-tune what information should be kept private to make it harder for the
algorithm to infer what competitors are doing. This may prove problematic in online
industries, as it may also increase consumers’ search costs. Thus one potential
experiment for the incubator is where pricing is conveyed only through asymmetrical
price comparison websites (where customers can quickly see the competitors’ prices,
but the pricing information is not captured by the algorithm).107

III.iv Merger Review
Competition authorities can also focus on deterring structural changes that foster
tacit collusion. As one U.S. court observed, “Tacit coordination is feared by antitrust
policy even more than express collusion, for tacit coordination, even when observed,
cannot easily be controlled directly by the antitrust laws. It is a central object of
merger policy to obstruct the creation or reinforcement by merger of such oligopolistic

Ivaldi et al (n 5).
One risk of this approach is if the price comparison website’s market power increases, to the
detriment of sellers and buyers. We explore this risk in Virtual Competition.
106
107
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market structures in which tacit coordination can occur.” 108 Thus, stronger merger
control, in particular, may be an option.
As a 2017 conference organized by the University of Chicago reflected, increasing
market concentration raises a host of economic, political and social concerns. 109 Thus,
multiple policy reasons exist to arrest the trend toward highly concentrated
industries. One factor is if tacit collusion, because of algorithms, spreads beyond
duopolies to markets with as many as five to six significant players. The agencies can
be more sensitive to whether the elimination of a particular player would increase
significantly the risk of algorithmic tacit collusion. It may be preserving a market of
diverse sellers with different horizons for profits and different capacity constraints.
One avenue is the target firm’s discount rate. Firms can sustain collusion when the
weight they put on future profits, measured by their discount factor, is above a certain
threshold. For example, if the firm’s discount factor is zero, then the firm needs and
wants the money now (via discounts) rather than the profits from tacit collusion. As
two economists noted, “One of the few broad generalizations that can be made from
the repeated-game model of collusion is that collusive stability is inversely related to
the discount rate. A collusive equilibrium that can be supported at one discount rate,
above some critical level, will be unsustainable at a rate below that critical level…
Firm-level changes in the discount rate may also affect cartel stability. For example,
a firm’s rate of time preference may change if its financing shifts to depend more
heavily on debt relative to equity. The increased reliance on debt requires fixed
payments to lenders, reducing the firm’s discretion and increasing its need for cash
flow in the short run.”110 Collusion, tacit or express, is sustainable “if and only if firms
put sufficient weight on future profits, i.e., if their discount factor is not too small.”111

F.T.C. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting 4 Phillip E. Areeda,
Herbert Hovenkamp and John L. Solow, Antitrust Law 901b2, at 9 (rev. ed.1998)).
109 Videos of the panels are available at https://research.chicagobooth.edu/stigler/events/singleevents/march-27-2017. See also Ezrachi, Sponge.
110 Levenstein and Suslow (n 19).
111 Ivaldi et al (n 5): “What is robust is that “no collusion” is sustainable if firms are highly
108
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Thus, if the acquired firm’s discount factor deviates below the critical threshold, it
may be effectively thwarting tacit collusion (or at least would be willing to do so if
other countermeasures were in place).
So, if firm-specific discount rates are relevant for cartel stability,112 the agency could
ascertain in the incubator what happens when these firms are acquired. Moreover,
firm-level changes in the discount rate may also affect cartel stability: “For example,
a firm’s rate of time preference may change if its financing shifts to depend more
heavily on debt relative to equity. The increased reliance on debt requires fixed
payments to lenders, reducing the firm’s discretion and increasing its need for cash
flow in the short run.”113 It is beyond the capacity or expertise for the competition
authority to dictate which route (debt or equity) that the firm should undertake. But
if the target’s choice is between a potentially anticompetitive merger or debt, the
agency can consider the potential pro-competitive benefits of debt.
The competition agency should also scrutinize conglomerate mergers when the
increase in multi-market contact softens competition.114 This may arise where the
same type of product or service (e.g., airlines and retail stores) is offered in different
geographic markets. Also one aspect of machine learning is to discover correlations
in large data sets.115 Thus, the algorithms can ascertain and respond to punishment
mechanisms in distinct product markets, which to the human may appear unrelated.

impatient (very small discount factor, δ close to zero) and that “full collusion” (i.e., monopoly
outcome) is sustainable when firms are very patient (large discount factor, δ close to 1). There
would thus exist two thresholds, one below which no collusion is sustainable, and one above which
full collusion is sustainable. Between these two thresholds, “more collusion” is achievable as the
discount factor increases, that is, firms can sustain higher prices when they have a higher
discount factor.”).
112 Levenstein and Suslow (n 19).
113 Ibid.
114 Federico Ciliberto and Jonathan W. William, ‘Does multimarket contact facilitate tacit
collusion? Inference on conduct parameters in the airline industry’, RAND Journal of Economics,
Vol. 45, No. 4, Winter 2014, pp. 764–791.
115 Shirley Pepke, ‘Machine learning reveals correlations of gene expression and outcomes in
ovarian
cancer’,
BMC
Series
Blog
(March
15
2017),
available
at
https://blogs.biomedcentral.com/bmcseriesblog/2017/03/15/machine-learning-reveals-

47

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2949434

Merger control, however, won’t work when other factors (such as the shift to
algorithmic pricing itself, or firms exiting unilaterally) foster the tacit collusion.
III.v. Increasing Likelihood of Deviation.

Besides merger review, additional counter-measures can target market structure by
facilitating entry, maverick behavior and the likelihood for deviation from the tacit
agreement.
To begin with, one could explore whether promoting entry by mavericks and reducing
regulatory entry barriers would destabilize algorithmic tacit collusion. Here, the
algorithmic incubator can examine for particular industries whether the entry by a
firm is sufficient to destabilize collusion, and, if so, for how long.
Another option may be facilitating secret deals while ensuring sufficient availability
of information for consumers (to limit discrimination). Such deals – away from the
market place – could allow companies to undercut the market price using direct
communications with buyers. As the European Commission noted, markets “need to
be sufficiently transparent to allow the coordinating firms to monitor to a sufficient
degree whether other firms are deviating, and thus know when to retaliate.”116 The
degree of transparency, the Commission noted “often depends on how market
transactions take place in a particular market.”117 The key element when evaluating
the level of market transparency “is to identify what firms can infer about the actions
of other firms from the available information.”118

correlations-of-gene-expression-and-outcomes-in-ovarian-cancer/ (noting that their machine
learning method called Correlation Explanation was “especially good at detecting weak
correlations in large sets of variables, and this is likely why it was able to detect this particular
pattern for the first time in ovarian cancer expression data”).
116 EC Merger Guidelines (n 6), para 49.
117 EC Merger Guidelines (n 6), para 50.
118 EC Merger Guidelines (n 6), para 50: “The speed with which deterrent mechanisms can be
implemented is related to the issue of transparency. If firms are only able to observe their
competitors' actions after a substantial delay, then retaliation will be similarly delayed and this
may influence whether it is sufficient to deter deviation.” Ibid para 53.
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The government may explore, for example, whether reverse bids or giving buyers call
options on multiple sellers help destabilize seller tacit collusion.119 Here the buyer,
but not the rivals, learns the price of each seller for a future order. For example,
rather than creating an app that simply tells you (and each competitor) the price of
gas at nearby stations, one could create an app where the consumers (or their selfdriving cars) simply say, “Need gas.” Each station then can offer the consumer the
best price. Your app signals your demand, the competing neighboring gas stations
offer their best quote, and the competing bid information (and geolocation data of
where you ended up buying gas) are not shared among the gas stations.
One potential risk in this approach, as we discuss above, is that it may under certain
market conditions foster price discrimination or the behavioral discrimination
assessed in Virtual Competition.
The algorithmic collusion incubator can test whether enabling smaller buyers to pool
their orders into less frequent, less predictable larger orders yields a better price from
the sellers’ algorithms, in effect rewarding a seller with greater profits to deviate from
the collusive regime.120
III.vi Algorithmic Combat
When algorithms and smart bots drive markets, another counter-measure may be in
the form of a ‘disruptive algorithm’ rather than traditional enforcement. Such
algorithm may be deployed to destabilize the existing equilibrium – through mixed
signaling and other means - targeting the core conditions necessary to sustain
conscious parallelism. State-sponsored algorithms or other mechanisms for joint

Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, ‘Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing A Legal Entitlement to Facilitate
Coasean Trade’, 104 Yale L.J. 1027, 1117 (1995).
120 Paul W. Dobson and Roman Inderst, The Waterbed Effect: Where Buying and Selling Power
Come Together, 2008 Wis. L. Rev. 331, 354 (2008) (“With a large order up for grabs, suppliers
may be more tempted to undercut any collusive regime and offer the large buyer a discount.”);
but see Levenstein and Suslow (n 19): “Although large customers may be able, in principle, to
destabilize cartels, in many cases they seem instead to extract concessions that reduce their
incentive to do so.”
119
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consumer bargaining or protection may try to undermine the collusive equilibrium or
affect levels of transparency.
The idea of a maverick algorithm skewing the market signals to destabilize tacit
collusion may seem appealing. But it may generate inefficiencies and distort
competition. Furthermore, it would likely lead to a race between algorithms, one
destabilizing while another predicting its action and engaging in counter-measures.
Thus, the incubator can test multiple types of disruption, and the attendant effect on
prices and consumer search costs.
A second avenue is the maxim, “It takes a computer to beat a computer.” Just as
humans will infrequently beat a computer poker, go, chess or checkers program, so
too they, despite their best efforts, will not consistently defeat the pricing algorithm.
In effect, whether shopping for gas or playing blackjack, the “house” often wins. To
better the odds, consumers can rely on algorithms programmed to maximize
consumer surplus.121 Professor Michal Gal explores the potential role of ‘Consumer
Algorithms’.122 These could assist in empowering consumers and re-balancing the
welfare equation.
Thus consumer-friendly algorithms in effect will play in the incubator against seller
algorithms seeking to maximize profits. Consumers may not always win, but like the
AI program that beat human poker players, they might generally win over many
matches. If the seller algorithms routinely beat the consumer algorithms,
government enforcers can test in the incubator measures to tilt the odds in the
consumer’s favor. Here, the consumer algorithms – either individually or tacitly
colluding—might enhance the buyers’ power and reveal strategies to further disrupt
tacit collusion. This counter-measure, of course, raises its own risks of distorting

On this point, see Gal, Michal S. and Elkin-Koren, Niva, ‘Algorithmic Consumers’ (August 8,
2016), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2876201, Harvard Journal of Law and
Technology, Vol. 30, 2017.
122 Ibid.
121
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competition, including oligopsony power. Still, a controlled effort to engage in
algorithmic combat may serve to limit possible adverse welfare effects.

III. vi Smart Regulation
As we explore in Virtual Competition, beyond the “laissez-faire competition good,
regulation bad” refrain, challenging questions await us. For instance—is the
algorithm price the competitive price, or merely a fiction created by the digitalized
hand? Turning to the economist Friedrich A. Hayek, we inquire whether the
emergence of super-platforms—companies that dominate the digital landscape—
could indicate a monumental shift toward the attainment of all knowledge. Platforms’
sophisticated computer algorithms could increasingly determine the competitive
market price. Data collection by leading platforms like the car-sharing app Uber, and
super-platforms like Google, Apple, and Amazon, could create an economy which, for
all purposes, is planned not by bureaucrats or CEOs, but by the techno-structure. If
so, a subsequent question arises: if private firms can harness Big Data and Big
Analytics to effectively set prices, can governments use the same tools to monitor
industry prices, or even determine a competitive price? If Uber, which doesn’t own
any cars or employ any drivers, can determine prices, why can’t the government?
Economist and policymakers over the past few years have been interested in
developing screens and tools to identify industries where cartels are likely
operating.123 Thus, one avenue to explore is harnessing Big Data and Big Analytics
to identify algorithmic tacit collusion. This might be attractive where the price is
significantly determined by a baseline price (such as crude oil price for gasoline) and

‘Ex officio cartel investigations and the use of screens to detect cartels’, OECD Competition
Committee (July 7 2014), available at https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/exofficio-cartelinvestigation-2013.pdf (identifying two general screening approaches: i) a structural approach,
which includes the analysis of structural and product characteristics of a specific market or
industry that make successful collusive strategies more likely; and ii) a behavioural approach,
which includes the identification through screening of firms’ behaviour or market outcomes that
may be the outcome by a collusive strategy).
123
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the other explanatory variables for price are observable. The legal obstacles in legally
challenging the tacit collusion under the current law remain. But the screening tools
can help policymakers prioritize the industries to test in the incubator and the likely
effects of various counter-measures.
A slightly more intrusive measure is to post a “competitive” bench price. For example,
the government can provide the gas apps with a “competitive” baseline price for gas,
from which customers can compare how much each gas station is charging above or
below that price. One risk is getting the competitive benchmark price wrong and its
susceptibility to being gamed (and inflated).

Concluding Remarks

As dynamic pricing yields a competitive advantage, we are witnessing more firms
turning to pricing algorithms. With so much additional profits at stake and the ability
to affect the market dynamic, it is no surprise that algorithmic price optimization is
attracting heavy investments. Ironically, even if some companies yearn for the days
of printed list prices and secretive discounts, they may switch to pricing algorithms
to prevent being at a competitive disadvantage.
As enforcers and policymakers increasingly recognize, the current antitrust
enforcement toolbox is limited in effectively deterring algorithm-driven tacit collusion
and behavioural discrimination.124 They recognize the difficulties and risks in finetuning

the

enforcement

policy

aimed

at

condemning

“excessive”

market

transparency. Similarly, active intervention through ‘good’ algorithms may distort
competition. This may be particularly challenging when the information and data are

124

John Naughton, ‘How do you throw the book at an algorithm?’, The Guardian (December 4 2016),

available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/04/how-do-you-throw-bookat-an-algorithm-internet-big-data.
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otherwise available to consumers and traders and it is the intelligent use of that
information that facilitates conscious parallelism.
On a positive note, many enforcers, judges, and policymakers, with whom we met,
appeared engaged and willing to meet the challenge. Since we were often asked, What
are we going to do about it?, we offer here several measures, including the tacit
collusion incubator. Nothing we propose is the elixir to deter algorithmic tacit
collusion (or the behavioral exploitation and hybrid collusion/discrimination)
scenarios. Nonetheless, these measures—in widening the toolbox—can bring us
closer in deterring the anticompetitive scenarios.
Of course, any enforcement action must account the costs of over-intervention. Yet,
the cost of under-intervention must also be acknowledged. Consumers and enforcers
with the current tools cannot blunt the siren song of profits from algorithmic tacit
collusion. Brick-and-mortar shops are closing at a faster rate. As they migrate to the
online world, they, like OK Benzin, will likely seek to maximize profits. To do so, they,
like OK Benzin, will turn to algorithms to improve their pricing analysis and lower
the cost of price wars or better yet, to avoid them altogether. No one will say tacit
collusion. The marketing message will be subtler—such as optimizing prices through
AI—but the end game is the same, namely supra-competitive profits.
So one cannot assume that market forces alone will yield the benefits of the datadriven economy while mitigating the risks. Further, one cannot assume that one
agency can do the job. To effectively tackle our hybrid collusion/behavioral
exploitation scenario, for example, we need greater coordination among the privacy,
consumer protection and competition authorities. So the aim for policymakers in the
EU, US and elsewhere, remains the same: to develop an inclusive data-driven
economy that benefits more than 1% of the population.
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